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Abstract 
This paper synthesizes auction and game theory literature into specific 
military acquisition improvement recommendations. We characterize acquisition 
environments into distinct categories, present the results of seminal literature that 
pertains to each category, and translate the literatures’ recommendations for military 
contracting practitioners. The relevant categories are procurement with unknown 
cost and no risk, item(s) with known costs and existent but understood stochastic 
risk, and item(s) with unknown costs and/or unknown stochastic risk. We break out 
these three categories into sub-categories depending on whether there are one or 
multiple potential competing vendors, and, if multiple, by whether we must buy one 
lot or potentially a schedule of lots from a host of vendors.  
Keywords: game theory, auctions, contracting, principle-agent models, Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs, off-the-shelf, mechanism design. 
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Introduction  
Secretary of Defense McNamara once famously said, “The government is not 
in the business of putting business out of business,” implying that when the 
government conducts private-sector contracting arrangements, the government 
should not abuse its monopsonist position to the detriment of American private-
sector defense contracting corporations. Back then – when federal budgets were 
better padded, our defense industrial base could stand to grow, and most competing 
defense contractors were 100% U.S. corporations – McNamara’s perspective was a 
luxury we pursued. Today, however, the landscape is quite different. Federal 
budgets are lean, our warfighting capabilities hinge greatly on the marginal dollar, 
our defense industrial base has grown to a more mature warfighting-sustaining size, 
and most defense contractors work closely with a network of international partners 
and subcontractors resulting in U.S. payment largess disseminated throughout that 
network. Also, since the time of McNamara there has been an explosion in auction 
and game theory literature. The private sector has worked diligently to implement 
these findings in its contracting practices. The time has now come for the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to also cull the auction and game theory literature 
holistically and systematically for practices that can help reduce costs, reduce risk, 
increase timeliness, and increase quality.   
In this paper, we categorize the DOD acquisitions landscape into three main 
categories: procurement of item(s) with unknown cost and no risk, item(s) with 
known costs and existent but known stochastic risk, and item(s) with unknown costs 
and/or unknown stochastic risk. We break out each of these three categories into a 
couple sub-categories depending on whether there are one or multiple potential 
competing vendors, and by whether we must buy one lot or potentially a schedule of 
lots from a host of vendors.  
One can argue that competitive auction environments may incite irrational 
bidding behavior. Perhaps bidders may get caught up in the game and deviate from 
theoretical predictions, or they may not have the underlying knowledge necessary to 
devise optimal bidding behavior in the first place. We believe that it is indeed 
reasonable to expect rational bidding.  As stakes get larger, bidding behavior trends 
more closely to theoretical predictions. In addition, even if bidders may have never 
been formally educated in bidding behavior, they can arrive at the same results 
through experience and corporate lessons learned. Just as shoppers at a grocery 
store don’t compute constrained optimization LaGrangians before checking out, yet 
economists still find that shoppers’ purchasing behavior matches well with the 
predictions of constrained optimization models, we argue that DOD contracting 
practitioners seeking to implement novel auction and game theoretic models should 
expect highly rational bidder responses, and especially as stakes increase. 
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Our hope is that DOD acquisition leadership is sensitive to the arguments 
made in this paper: that the distinct environments we outline warrant distinct 
acquisition approaches. The acquisition approaches we recommend, specific as 
they may be, are all available through the current contracting quiver of contract types 
and conditioning. Our subsequent hope is that contracting practitioners seek to 
execute the approach recommendations. We are seeking funding for this next fiscal 
year to facilitate the implementation of this research by translating our 
recommendations specifically for the T-38 replacement acquisition environment.  
The files we would publish from the follow on study, a contracting practitioner 
handbook that succinctly characterizes the contracting categories and 
recommendation highlights devoid of the justifications, should make these 
contracting approach recommendations readily implementable by the practitioner.  
Federal Acquisition Types 
Before developing the discussion of each distinct environment, a brief 
discussion of core underlying principles of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
and associated contracting principles is warranted. This discussion will focus on 
three areas: the general contract categories applicable to federal contracts, federal 
contract types, and bid/negotiation regulations. 
There are multiple federal contract types, but two general contract categories 
are applicable when referring to Major Defense Acquisition Programs: Cost 
Reimbursement and Fixed Price. In general terms, a Cost Reimbursement contract 
means the government will pay all of a contractor’s allowable costs plus a pre-
negotiated fee, while a Fixed Price contract means the government will pay an exact 
pre-negotiated amount for delivery of a completed project or service (Rumbaugh, 
2010, p. 72). Generally, Fixed Price contracts are favored by the government, since 
they involve little or no price risk for the government (Rumbaugh, 2010, p. 78]). 
Conversely, Cost Reimbursement contracts tend to be favored by contractors, since 
they involve little or no profit risk for the contractor. 
Within each of these general contract groups there are multiple contract 
types. The Fixed Price contract group can be broken down into several contract 
types, including Firm Fixed Price (FFP), Firm Fixed Price with Economic Price 
Adjustment (FP/EPA), and Fixed-Price Incentive (FPI). Generally, the least risky 
contract type for the government is Firm Fixed Price. Under the Firm Fixed Price 
contract type, contractors theoretically bear 100% of the risks of performance. Figure 
1 depicts this inverse risk relationship, while excluding contract types not significant 
to this paper. 
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Figure 1. Types of Contracts by Risk (adapted from Griffin & Schilling, 
2011, p. 24) 
In the reverse of Firm Fixed Price, under the Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract 
type, the government bears 100% of the risks of performance, in practical terms. 
Generally, the government bears less risk under the Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) 
contract type, and still less under the Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) contract type. 
There are three methods of acquisition prescribed in the FAR: simplified 
acquisition procedures (FAR Part 13), sealed bidding (FAR Part 14), and contracting 
by negotiation (FAR Part 15). Only sealed bidding and contracting by negotiation are 
used in a significant manner for MDAPs, since simplified acquisition procedures are 
limited to contracts too small (FAR 2.101) to factor in seriously to the total cost of an 
MDAP. Additionally, acquisitions under FAR Part 12, commercial acquisition, are 
sometimes viewed as a fourth acquisition method; in fact, “the rules for each of the 
three methods also govern commercial item procurements, but they are simplified… 
to encourage broader participation by commercial contractors” (Rumbaugh, 2010, p. 
67).  
Under sealed bidding, only price and price-related factors stated in the 
Invitation for Bid can be used as decision factors for any bid conforming to the 
minimum requirements of the acquisition (Rumbaugh, 2010, p. 70; FAR 14.408-1). 
This necessarily restricts the use of sealed bidding to FFP and FP/EPA contracts 
(FAR 14.104). Per FAR 6.401, sealed bidding is required when 
 there is enough time for soliciting, submitting, and evaluating sealed 
bids; 
 the award will be made on the basis of price and other price-related 
factors; 
 it is not necessary to conduct discussions with the responding bidders 
about their bids; and 
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 there is a reasonable expectation of receiving more than one sealed 
bid. 
This necessitates that the specifications are precise enough to permit price and 
price-related factors to be the determining criteria for award (Rumbaugh, 2010, p. 
70) and means that a conforming bid will win only on the basis of price; no price and 
performance trade-offs are permitted between conforming bids.  
Under contracting by negotiation, only factors stated in Request for Proposal 
(RFP) can be used as decision factors for a proposal, but, in contrast to sealed 
bidding, non-price factors may be used. Using factors stated in the RFP, the source 
selection authority can select between those offerors who are not dominated in the 
trade-space between all decision factors. For example, in the case of an RFP where 
only the factors of cost and past performance were considered and the submitted 
RFPs were rated as shown in Table 1, only offers 1, 2, and 3 could be considered by 
the source selection authority (SSA), assuming the SSA agreed with the ratings of 
each offer. 
Table 1. Notional Offeror Ratings With Only Two Factors Considered 
 Offeror 1 Offeror 2 Offeror 3 Offeror 4 Offeror 5 






Excellent  Excellent Good 
Offer 4 would be dominated by Offer 3, while Offer 5 would be dominated by offer 2. 
According to FAR 15.101-1, a tradeoff process is appropriate when the government 
will consider contract award to other than the lowest priced offeror or other than the 
highest technically rated offeror. 
Similar to the risk continuum for contract types, the factors rated as important 
in the RFP can be considered along a “best value continuum,” as stated in FAR 
15.101,  
In different types of acquisitions, the relative importance of cost or 
price may vary. For example, in acquisitions where the requirement is 
clearly definable and the risk of unsuccessful contract performance is 
minimal, cost or price may play a dominant role in source selection 
[contractor selection]. The less definitive the requirement, the more 
development work required, or the greater the performance risk, the 
more technical or past performance considerations may play a 
dominant role in source selection. 
One can see, then, how the risk of poor technical and schedule performance relative 
to a contractor’s offer is traded off against offer price similarly to the implicit tradeoff 
made in selecting a contract type. 
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This brief discussion targeted the core principles of fixed price and cost plus 
contract types and reviewed bid/negotiation regulations found primarily in FAR Parts 
14 and 15.  
Imperfectly Known Vendor Cost, No Risk (OTS): 
Auctions 
If the government knows the product or service it seeks, that solution exists 
without any development or delivery risk (the item is available off the shelf [OTS]), 
and the contractor cost is well gauged, then the cost and cost risk minimizing 
contracting approach is for the government buyer to price discriminate: charge a 
contractor exactly his cost or willingness to sell. As this is sometimes viewed as 
anticompetitive in the private sector, it might not always be good practice for the 
government to pursue this tactic. If so, then the next best approach from a cost and 
cost risk minimizing framework would be the same as the approach should the 
government not know the contractor seller cost: auctions. There are many kinds of 
auctions and other similar truth-revealing incentive mechanisms. Solving for optimal 
bidding behavior, and thus, auctioneer surplus, is complicated and dependent on 
many factors. Fortunately Myerson, Vickrey, Clark, Groves, and others have made 
incredible academic progress characterizing optimality conditions for auctions and 
these other incentive mechanisms. It is worthwhile to note that even though the 
auction formats we recommend consist of a single buyer facing many sellers as 
compared to the more traditional examples with a single seller facing many buyers 
(e.g., eBay), the analysis is analogous and the results generalize. 
No Product Differentiation: Identical Competing Products 
In this section we start with the simplest case where the competing products 
or services have no differentiation in either quality or timeliness. Once we describe 
the optimal auction and incentive mechanisms for this identical product(s) and 
service(s) world, we will discuss how to generalize these mechanisms should there 
be differences in the product/service quality and timeliness. 
Procurement of a Single Item 
This section pertains to the situation in which the government seeks to buy 
one single item, such as one generator.  If the government seeks to buy a batch of 
identical OTS items, it may want to procure this as a single batch, but may also want 
to allow for divided contractor supply of the desired capacity depending on a couple 
factors yet.  We characterize those factors later in Procurement of Multiple Items. 
The first case we will look at is the simplest case for product procurement. In 
this case, the product that is needed has already been developed and is readily 
available for purchase from numerous companies. It is a case where only a single 
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product is needed and the military would simply like to acquire it for the lowest 
possible price.  
In this situation of a no risk off-the-shelf solution with multiple competing 
vendors offering identical products/services with identical time lines and the 
government only seeking one, the government cost minimizing procurement method 
is a second-price auction.  Second price auctions can either be implemented via 
sealed bid when not all bidding vendors are available at the same moment, or as a 
descending price event (single buyer version of the ascending English oral auction).  
We describe both in more detail immediately below. 
A sealed bid second price auction traditionally consists of a single seller 
soliciting sealed bids from competing bidding potential buyers.  The seller allocates 
the item to the highest bidder, but does not charge that bidder his bid, but instead 
charges him the second highest bid.  This may at first cause the reader or 
contracting practitioner consternation: Why not charge the highest bidder more—his 
bid, for instance?  The answer is that if the auction had been specified to charge the 
highest bidder his bid, this would have resulted in different bidding behavior, and as 
proven by Myerson, the seller revenue is greater in the second price auction (1981). 
The intuition is that in order to generate higher bidding closer to the buyers’ true 
valuations, we need to break a bidders’ payment from his bid.  Excepting some 
technical implementation discrepancies, this is the same auction format eBay 
provides, why sellers flock to eBay, and why eBay has had the success they’ve had.  
It is worth noting that there is some foregone seller revenue, the difference between 
the high bidder’s bid and the second high bid, and economists generally refer to this 
difference as the value of the information paid by the seller to learn the bidders’ true 
valuations or willingness to pay (to learn the demand curve).  
In addition to proving that the sealed bid second price auction maximizes 
seller revenue, Myerson also proved that it is equivalent to the ascending English 
oral auction where a seller starts with a low price and then incrementally raises the 
price until only one buyer remains.  The intuition behind the equivalence is that the 
last remaining bidder receives the item at the price one increment above the second 
highest valuation, where the other last bidder dropped out.   
In the government buyer setting, the government should solicit vendor sealed 
bids, buy from the low bidder, and pay the low bidder the next highest bid.  This 
government buyer sealed bid auction would also be equivalent to a descending oral 
auction where the government would start by announcing a really high price where 
presumably all contractors would be eager to take the contract, and then 
incrementally lowering the price until one contractor remains who will get the 
contract for one increment below the next lowest contractor’s willingness to sell.   
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After having taught Game Theory and Auctions for several years, I 
(Mastronardi) can attest to the fact that even though second price and English oral 
auctions are common online (eBay), at county fairs, and other settings, the 
Myerson’s result is rarely intuitively obvious, and those new to auctions often 
innately assume that a first price auction can generate the auctioneer greater 
surplus. The first price auction in a standard selling auctioneer setting is where the 
item is allocated to the highest bidder for his bid. Fortunately for naïve auctioneers, 
as the number of bidders increases in an auction, the difference between bidders’ 
bids and their true valuations, how much they will shave their bid away from their 
valuation to increase their surplus, decreases and asymptotically approaches the 
second price auction bidding behavior and auction surplus allocations.  Many DOD 
procurements are effectively first price auctions (item allocated to lowest bidding 
vendor at his bid) with a few bidding vendors, and so there are in general cost 
savings left on the table compared to DOD procurements where the contract would 
go to the lowest bidder for the second lowest bid because the second price auction 
will induce lower vendor bids. 
Finally, the government can also utilize auction reserve prices for even 
greater potential cost savings.  By announcing that the government will award a 
contract to the lowest bidder at the second lowest bid only if the lowest bidder is 
below a specified reserve, the government can decrease its expected cost.  Having 
a reserve price introduces a trade-off between auctioneer surplus and the possibility 
that no bidder will meet the reserve and the good goes unallocated.  Depending on 
the acquisition environment, this may be a trade-off the government is sometimes 
willing to take to a degree.  For instance if the government has flexibility in the need 
or the timing of the need, it may choose to invoke a reserve, and if bidders satisfy 
the reserve with low bids, great, and if not, not a big deal. 
To assess the optimal auction mechanism, we may look to an analogous 
situation where the government is the sole seller of an object (the contract) with 
possibly many buyers (as opposed to the monopsonist environment wherein the 
government is the only purchaser of an object). This problem is thoroughly 
addressed by Myerson, and begins with a few definitions and assumptions (1981). 
Again, there is only one seller with only a single object to sell, who is also 
facing n bidders. Let N represent the set of bidders: 
N = {1,...,n}.       (1) 
We distinguish between two bidders in N with i and j (i, j∈N). For each bidder i, the 
value estimate is represented by ti , and is the maximum amount for which i would be 
willing to pay for the object. Furthermore, the seller does not know the exact value of 
ti. We assume that the seller’s uncertainty about i’s value estimate is described by 
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the continuous probability distribution fi:[ai,bi]ℝ+, where ai is the lowest possible value 
of ti  and bi represents the maximum value of ti (Myerson, 1981). 
To be clear, an auction mechanism is any such auction game that includes a 
description of the strategies which the bidders are expected to use. We therefore 
describe the auction mechanism as a pair of outcome functions (p, x) where pi(t) is 
the probability that i gets the object and xi(t) is the price that i expects to pay, given ti. 
We then define 
𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑡𝑖) = ∫ 𝑝𝑖(𝑡)𝑓−𝑖(𝑡−𝑖)𝑑𝑡−𝑖
𝑇−𝑖
                                                   (2) 
to be the conditional probability that i will get the object from the auction mechanism 
(p,x), given the value estimate of ti. 
Using this strategy, Myerson (1981) moved to maximize the seller’s expected 
utility U0, and showed that it is determined entirely by the probability function p (this 
determines which bidder gets the object in every situation) and by the numbers 
Ui(p,x,ai), which represent the expected utility of each bidder if his value estimate 
were at its lowest. Essentially, the seller gets the same expected utility from any two 
auction mechanisms which have the following two properties: (a) the object always 
goes to the highest bidder, as long as his bid is higher than the seller’s own value 
estimate; and (b) every bidder can expect a zero utility if value estimates were at the 
lowest possible level. Furthermore, Myerson (1981) commented that the auction 
studied and proposed by Vickrey (1961), wherein the winning bidder pays the 
second highest price, is the special case of this general solution. Vickrey’s auction is 
optimal if and only if the bidders are symmetric (i.e., there exist universal high and 
low valuations and each bidder has the same probability distribution), and ai = 0 and 
ei = 0 (i.e., bidder i’s valuation would not change if he were to become aware of 
bidder j’s valuation). 
It is important to note that these results do not hold in a common value 
auction (with imperfect information). In this case the item being auctioned has a 
common value (i.e., it is of roughly equal value to all bidders) and the bidders do not 
know the item’s market value. Each player’s bid then comes primarily from his or her 
own private estimation of the market value. If we assume that the average bid is 
accurate, the auction winner—the individual with the highest bid—will tend to 
overpay. This phenomenon is known as the winner’s curse. The severity of the 
winner’s curse is exacerbated by higher numbers of bidders; as the number of 
bidders increases it becomes more likely that some have overestimated the item’s 
value. However, overpayment will occur only if the winner has failed to account for 
winner’s curse when placing the bid. It is reasonable to expect that a rational bidder 
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will avoid the winner’s curse by bid shading, or placing a bid that is lower than his ex 
ante estimation of the item’s value. 
Procurement of Multiple Items 
A natural extension to the case of Procurement of a Single Item discussed in 
the prior section is when multiple identical items must be procured—such as Meals 
Ready to Eat (MREs). We assume that the military has a very large demand for 
MREs such that one company may not be able to supply all the demand or that it 
would be most cost-effective for multiple companies to supply the government. Here 
we reach this subset of the environment addressed in the Procurement of a Single 
Item section where we do not assume a single bidder, but rather multiple bidders. A 
spectrum auction is a classic example of this environment, where a regulatory 
agency (such as the government) sells the rights to use sections of bandwidth to 
multiple agents. 
Though it may seem logical to use the same auction described in the previous 
section (Procurement of a Single Item), it would not be the appropriate mechanism. 
Applying a sealed bid second price auction to this situation would be known as a 
generalized or uniform second-price auction. Unlike in the previous section, 
however, this auction structure does not induce multiple bidders to bid for multiple 
items truthfully. As a result, this auction structure is problematic for an auction 
environment with multiple items. 
In order to allow multiple items to be procured from a multitude of bidders 
while still maintaining a truth-telling mechanism, theory recommends the use of an 
auction structure that implements what is known as a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) 
mechanism. In essence, the VCG is designed to minimize the price of the items to 
the auctioneer by having each bidder pay the cost that his participation introduces to 
the other players. This structure would allow the auctioneer to keep the necessary 
truth-telling mechanism that he desires, while allowing the auctioneer to procure 
multiple similar items from multiple vendors at the lowest price.  
Google and Facebook both use VCG auctions when allocating space on their 
websites for advertisements. Companies looking to post ads report values for real 
estate on the site, then the VCG mechanism is used to determine the appropriate 
allocation. This is appropriate because there are multiple areas for advertisement, all 
of which are the same—multiple identical items—and require a VCG auction to 
induce truth-telling by bidders.  
William Vickrey made his original contribution through his design of what later 
became known as the “Vickrey auction.” In the case described in the previous 
section, where a single item is auctioned, the Vickrey auction is equivalent to the 
second-price sealed-bid auction. These terms are used differently in this case, 
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where multiple identical items are sold. Vickrey won the Nobel Prize for his design, 
which is the foundation of auction theory. Vickrey’s original auction design has been 
melded with the Clarke-Groves design for public goods (Clarke, 1971). The resulting 
auction works for heterogeneous goods and has looser requirements for bidders’ 
value functions (Ausubel & Milgrom, 2006). 
The essence of the VCG auction is that the winning bidder pays the 
“opportunity cost” for the units won, and his payment depends only on his 
opponent’s reported values. By entering into the auction, each bidder alters the 
benefit received by all other participants, usually to a detriment: described by the 
allocation and payment rules. 
The allocation rule says that the mechanism will allocate resources in a way 
that maximizes total reported utility. The allocation rule can be shown 
mathematically: 
𝜒(𝑣) ∈ arg  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑥 ∑ 𝑣𝑖(𝑥)
𝑖
                                                              (3) 
The payment rule stipulates that the payment made by each bidder in the 
auction reflects his social impact on the other bidders. In VCG auctions, a bidder’s 
payment depends on whether he is a pivotal player—one whose participation affects 
the utility received by the other players. Specifically, each bidder pays the value of 
the other participants had he not taken part in the auction minus their values when 
he does participate. Shown informally,1 paymenti = [∑U-i | i does not participate] – 
[∑U-i | i participates], or formally, 
 




                                     (4) 
A simple example of the VCG mechanism may further demonstrate the 
theory. Consider the situation described above where an agency is auctioning 
bandwidth to two agents (a spectrum auction). There are two spectrums units to 
auction and there is no difference between them. The agents’ true values are shown 
in Table 2. 
Table 2. Spectrum Auction 
 Agent 1 Agent 2 
1 Unit 8 11 
2 Units 18 20 
 
                                            
1
 An expanded description of the VCG mechanism can be found in Appendix, item 1.  
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Using Equation 4 or the informal equation immediately above it, we can 
calculate the payments for both players: 
payment (1) = 20 - 20 = 0 
payment (2) = 18 - 0 = 18 
In this case, Agent 2 wins 2 units at a price of 18, and Agent 1 gets nothing 
and pays 0. Looking at each payment equation, we can see that Agent 1 pays the 
value of Agent 2 had he not participated in the auction (20) minus the value of Agent 
2 when he does participate (20). Alternatively, Agent 2 pays the value Agent 1 
receives when Agent 2 does not participate (18) minus the value of Agent 1 when 
Agent 2 does participate (0).2 
When applying this mechanism to a military acquisition setting, there are 
some important considerations. The most important point is that for procurement 
auctions, the military is looking for the lowest price bid by participants. The VCG 
concepts and process still apply, but instead act to find the most reduced and truthful 
price for the military. We can go back to the example in which the military is looking 
to acquire MREs from multiple companies. To do this, the military would ask for a 
demand schedule from each company. This would include different prices for 
different amounts of MREs that they are willing to supply (most likely, they would 
offer a lower price per MRE as quantity increases). The military would then find the 
social impact of each company in order to determine how many MREs to buy from 
each company to minimize cost.  
Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) said that the VCG mechanism has several 
important strengths. The first is the dominant-strategy property, which reduces the 
cost of the auction by making it easier for bidders to determine their optimal bidding 
strategies and by eliminating their incentives to try to learn about competitor’s values 
or strategies. This also adds to the efficiency of the auction. Another virtue of VCG is 
its scope of application. The basic rules of the auction can be altered slightly if the 
auctioneer wishes to impose some extra constraints. For example, the seller may 
want to limit the concentration of ownership of an item. Or, the buyer in a 
procurement auction might want to limit its total purchases from first-time bidders or 
require that total capacity of suppliers is some percentage of the amount ordered. 
These constraints can be added without affecting the theory in any essential way. A 
final advantage to VCG is that average revenues are not less than that from any 
other efficient mechanism. The VCG mechanism is the only direct reporting 
mechanism (the buyers themselves report values) with dominant strategies, efficient 
outcomes, and zero payments by losing bidders. 
                                            
2
 A more complex and concrete illustration of the VCG mechanism can be found in the Appendix, item 
2. 
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However, Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) also explained that the VCG 
mechanism has several possible weaknesses, including low (or zero) seller 
revenues, non-monotonicity of the seller’s revenues in the set of bidders and the 
amount bid, vulnerability to collusion by a coalition of losing bidders, and 
vulnerability to the use of multiple bidding identities by a single bidder. When every 
bidder has “perfect substitutes” preferences, the listed weaknesses will never occur. 
However, if there is even one bidder whose preferences violate the substitutes 
condition, and the remaining bidders choose values appropriately, all of the listed 
weaknesses will be present. There are other drawbacks to VCG. The Vickrey theory 
assumes that bidders’ payoffs are linear under certain arguments and requires that 
there is no effective budget limit to constrain bidders and that the buyer, in a 
procurement auction, has no overall limit on its cost of procurement. The dominant 
strategy property breaks down when bidders have limited budgets. The VCG auction 
may also present a privacy preservation problem. Bidders may rationally be reluctant 
to report their true values, fearing that the information they reveal will later be used 
against them. Without private values, VCG auctions immediately lose their 
dominant-strategy property. These weaknesses limit the practicality of using VCG 
auctions in Federal procurement. 
Ausubel (2004), on the other hand, explained that there may be an alternative 
efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple similar objects that is simpler for bidders 
to understand and has the advantage of assuring the privacy of the upper portions of 
bidders’ demand curves. This “dynamic” auction yields the same outcome as the 
sealed-price Vickrey auction when bidders have pure private values. With 
interdependent values, the proposed auction may still yield efficiency, whereas the 
Vickrey auction fails. The auctioneer calls a price, bidders respond with quantities, 
and the process iterates with increasing prices until demand is no greater than 
supply. However, a bidder’s payment does not equal his final quantity times the final 
price. Rather, at each price p, the auctioneer determines whether, for any bidder i, 
the aggregate demand x − i (p) of bidder i’s rivals is less than the supply M. If so, the 
difference is deemed “clinched,” and any goods newly clinched are awarded to 
bidder i at price p. 
For example, suppose that five objects are available and that four bidders A, 
B, C, and D initially bid for quantities of 3, 2, 2, and 2, respectively. The collective 
demand of the “losing” bidders is six, which exceeds the supply of five, so the 
auctioneer must raise the price. Suppose that bidders continue to bid these 
quantities until price p, when Bidder D reduces from 2 units to 0, dropping out of the 
auction. While there continues to be excess demand in total, Bidder A’s opponents 
now collectively demand only four units, while five are available. Bidder A therefore 
clinches one unit at price p, and the auction (for the remaining objects) continues. 
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This process continues until all the items are clinched. This is easily applied to a 
military setting (see the MRE example above).  
Ausubel showed that there are some key advantages to this type of auction 
over the former Vickrey auction. The new (dynamic) auction format outperforms the 
(static) Vickrey auction on efficiency. Moreover, there are at least two sets of 
examples within this model for which the dynamic auction raises higher expected 
revenues. Simplicity and privacy-preservation are also key strengths, as well as 
robustness to interdependent valuations. 
While the VCG mechanism is an excellent auction to use for multiple similar 
items because it is an efficient truth-telling mechanism, it is also very complicated. 
For the military’s purposes, the Dynamic Vickrey auction proposed by Ausubel may 
be a better option because it is simpler for bidders to understand and provides 
privacy-preservation. 
Differentiated Products: Heterogeneous Competing Products 
In this next section we examine a further subset of the imperfectly known 
cost, no risk area of the defense acquisition marketplace consisting of differentiated, 
or heterogeneous product acquisition. In this subset we assume that the government 
is buying existing off-the-shelf products as in the previous two subsections, but in 
this case these products will be differentiated from each other on one or more key 
attributes. An excellent example of this is the purchase of computers for a 
government organization. While these products will be off-the-shelf and thus carry 
no developmental risk, the government does not know the cost of these computers 
and could choose any one of a number of alternatives, which have different costs 
and quality aspects. Continuing with the example of computers, these attributes 
would consist of things such as hard drive space, screen size, weight, the presence 
and number of USB drives, or the speed at which they could be delivered, while an 
alternative would be a model of computer, such as the Fujitsu Lifebook, the Lenovo 
ThinkPad, or the Apple MacBook. In order to decide which computers to buy, the 
government will need to run some type of competitive decision-making mechanism, 
such as an auction, to decide on the product with the ideal combination of attributes 
and cost. This last point is the crux of this section, and is expanded considerably.   
Currently the government’s preferred mechanism for procuring differentiated 
goods is a method generally referred to as the Request For Proposals, or RFP, 
mechanism (FAR 15.203). With an RFP, the government predetermines several 
attributes (cost not among them) which it considers important and which it will 
“grade” the various alternatives on. The government then makes these important 
attributes public and requests a proposal from any contractor willing to submit one. 
The government then waits until a predetermined deadline for submission passes 
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and evaluates the proposals which have been submitted. If any one aspect of a 
proposed alternative in a proposal does not meet the requirements set forth on the 
key attributes, the alternative is often thrown out entirely. The government then 
decides from the remaining alternatives on the “ideal” alternative satisfying the 
requirements at a low cost.  
Several problems present themselves in this mechanism. First, there is a 
danger of misspecification by the government on its requirements, leading to 
alternatives being thrown out when they deserve consideration. This danger is 
compounded by the fact that many purchases are made by surrogate actors, in this 
case acquisitions officers, rather than by the users of the products themselves. 
Furthermore, by letting producers know the exact specifications of a needed product, 
each producer is able to judge not only how capable they are of meeting that 
specification, but also how capable each of their competitors are, thus creating a 
situation where only a single producer will submit a bid that just undercuts the next 
best bid from a competitor, thus reducing competition and increasing the expected 
price paid by the government (Athey, Levin, & Seira, 2004). Finally, RFP, the 
mechanism currently used by the DOD, will generally procure items which exceed 
the quality, and as a result, cost, of that which was required by the initial request 
(Che, 1993). 
In order to correct these deficiencies with the RFP mechanism, we turn to the 
available academic literature for alternative mechanisms which the government 
could use in future acquisitions.  Though these mechanisms are largely theoretical 
and each present problems of their own, they present a promising direction in which 
to take future acquisitions strategy.  
Che (1993) argued that the optimal scoring rule in a multidimensional auction 
will discriminate against quality (such that a high quality item will be penalized), but 
that this scoring rule requires strong commitment power, which is nearly impossible 
in defense acquisitions. Also important to note is the tendency for a surrogate actor 
to procure quality in excess of what is desired.  In this case the second preferred 
offer auction may be optimal (where the winning bidder must match the second 
bidder’s cost and quality). Finally, Che stated that either first or second price 
auctions will achieve this outcome. 
Branco (1997) further analyzed multidimensional score auctions in a manner 
similar to Che, with the critical exception that he assumed costs between bidders to 
be correlated as opposed to the independent costs assumed in Che. This changes 
the optimal structure to be that of a two stage first or second price multidimensional 
auction, in which the first round consists of a score auction in the style of Che to 
determine the most efficient alternative, then a second round of bargaining between 
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the bidder and the buyer to determine the specific quality to be supplied. This 
conclusion is ratified by Wise and Morrison (2000).  
Melese, Richter, and Simon (2011) further expanded the model, exploring a 
mechanism by which cost is excluded from the decision variables entirely. Instead, 
bidders are asked to submit a quality bid on different factors based on a range of 
different budgets. This will result in the buyer having information on the bidders’ 
quality capabilities over a range of different budgets, which will then allow the buyer 
to select based on a probability distribution of expected future budgets. This is 
particularly valuable in the realm of large-scale, long-term military acquisitions where 
budgets are constantly changing as it would allow the buyer to select a less risky bid 
proposal with respect to future price increases.   
Another possible auction design theory, a bid credit auction, is described by 
Shachat and Swarthout (2003). First they described an RFP in which buyers provide 
evaluation criteria on quality and receive prices and qualities from the various 
bidders. They likened this situation to a sealed bid first price auction with private 
values. The differential between cost and quality will be used to determine a 
winner. Second they described an English auction with bidding credits (EBC auction) 
where the buyer provides evaluation criteria to bidders, who then provide 
descriptions of their products. The buyer then distributes bidding credits depending 
on the observed relative quality. This credit is then used by the bidders in a second 
round of auctioning, in which an English, descending price auction is held until the 
lowest price bid wins. However, upon empirical experimentation, the authors 
concluded that real-world actors don’t follow the Nash equilibrium in the RFP and 
that buyers assign overly generous bidding credits in the EBC. This behavior results 
in the EBC actually outperforming the RFP in terms of both bidder and buyer 
surplus. 
From these selected articles, the next step is to determine the most effective 
mechanism for procuring items in a differentiated market for the DOD. Currently, as 
the vast majority of contracts in this market are what are called “fixed price” 
contracts, in which the item, quantity, schedule, and price are all determined at the 
outset of the contract, the most effective mechanism is a combination of the auction 
types described above, depending on the exact product to be procured.  
The first and most logical step to formulating an auction is to set a variety of 
attributes which the government will be evaluating different proposals from the 
sellers. The government should inform the potential sellers of these key attributes, 
but should not tell them exactly what the weights for each key attribute will be. For a 
smaller item, such as the batch of pens described above, this will be a simple one or 
two variable request. However, for a more complex differentiated item, such as 
computers, there will be many attributes by which each seller’s alternative will be 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 16 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
evaluated. In each case, however, cost will be considered as an independent 
variable with a weight more or less than the other attributes of the product.  
In addition to this scoring rule, if negotiations are expected to be repeated 
every year for additional procurement, an additional level of complexity should be 
added to the request. This would likely be the case in a large organization, for 
example, where different portions of the organization will need to purchase 
computers each year. If that is the case, the government should require each seller 
to submit a bid for several possible budget levels. The government should specify 
which of those possible budget levels will be most likely in the current budget cycle, 
but given the constant budget uncertainty, the government should reserve the right 
to change the budget level in future years’ negotiations. Thus, the government will 
require each potential seller to submit a bid filling the budget level for this year, as 
well as a schedule of potential future budget levels. It is important to note here that, 
as opposed to the more simplistic model above, cost would be excluded from the 
decision entirely, as it would instead be captured by the budget schedule. The 
information provided to the government by sellers with this variety of budget levels 
will enable this budget flexibility without the constraints under a fixed price contract. 
This mechanism is similar to that described by Melese, Richter, and Simon, 
who first proposed its use in their 2011 paper. Under this mechanism, the optimal 
bidding rule will be as described by the authors and of the following form: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑉(𝐴𝑖) = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
                                                        (5) 
where V is the bidder’s valuation of the contract, A is the bid amount, n is the 
number of bidders, w is the weight the buyer places on attribute j, and a is the level 
of attribute j offered by vendor i. From here, each vendor’s supply problem is 
modeled with the microeconomic supply function. Specifically, 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑄(𝐴𝑖) = ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑎𝑖𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚
𝑛
𝑗=1
                                       (6) 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑇𝐶𝑖 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑖𝑗) ≤ 𝐵
𝑚
𝑗=1
                                                    (7) 
where Q(A) is the value function to the bidder, c(a) is the cost as a function of 
the amount of attribute a placed by bidder j, and B is the hypothetical budget set 
forth by the government. In this situation the problem becomes a LaGrangian 
function, and results in each bidder bidding the amount of attribute a which it 
believes the government values. Though this result is intuitive, it suggests that the 
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bidding market will function as an efficient competitive marketplace despite the 
exclusion of cost from the decision variables, especially in an environment with a 
large amount of bidders such as in off-the-shelf goods.   
Throughout these solutions we are making several key assumptions which 
should undergo further scrutiny. The first is that there are a relatively large number 
of well-endowed firms willing to bid. In practice the government often deals with only 
a handful of firms, or in some cases only one firm.  Oftentimes, these firms also have 
vastly different resources—one needs only to compare the Big Five defense firms to 
the rest of the industry to appreciate this reality.  The second key assumption is that 
of zero costs to entry or to bid preparation.  In our models, introducing barriers to 
entry would restrict competition and influence bidding behavior in a complex manner, 
and would vary some of the conclusions of this paper.  However, in the defense 
industry, there are often significant costs to bid preparation—sometimes ranging into 
the millions of dollars for a single project. While the government does make some 
effort to compensate for these bid preparation efforts, oftentimes it fails to fully 
recoup firms for their costs. Also important are the high barriers to entry in the 
defense market. Firms must not only have considerable infrastructure in place to bid 
on larger, more capital intensive projects for the DOD, but oftentimes must go 
through a lengthy approval process to do business with the government in the first 
place. When working with classified materials, this process is even longer and more 
costly, and represents another considerable barrier to entry which would affect the 
conclusions of this paper.   
In summary, there are several different options available to the government in 
the acquisition of differentiated multi attribute goods. The ideal mechanism is that 
which captures cost as a constraint outside of the model, rather than included in the 
model as an independent variable. However, there are limitations to this approach 
and the government would do well to consider alternatives described in this section if 
any of the assumptions prove grossly false. However, one common theme of each 
mechanism described is clear: the current RFP mechanism leaves much to be 
desired and should be modified to achieve ideal efficiency in government acquisition 
of differentiated goods.   
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Product Procurement in Principal-Agent Models 
In this section of the paper, the government is no longer acquiring an item 
already in existence and must work with a contractor to procure the item or service. 
Accordingly, the government is acquiring item(s) with known or unknown costs 
and/or known or unknown stochastic risk. Currently, the military is the entity that 
assesses the risk of each proposal through a committee process that takes into 
account many factors, and not all of them are certain. In the current environment, 
each bidder simply submits a bid and it is up to the military to determine if the 
company can really deliver the needed item up to the bid’s specifications. We feel 
that this is an unnecessary risk on the part of the military and that each bidder can 
better assess their own project’s risk and, if given the right incentive, would be willing 
to pass on this more precise information to the military’s item scoring committee.  
Procurement with a Single Agent 
In the first environment we assumed that the military knew both the cost and 
risk of the items they wished to procure; however, in this next section we look at how 
the situation changes when the military does not know the risk involved of the 
project. An example of this environment would be if the military wished to work with 
a company in the development of a new technology. These types of situations are 
often referred to as principal-agent problems, where the military acts as the principal 
and the contractor is the agent. A simple diagram illustrating the basic frame work of 
the problem is shown in Figure 2 where the principal wishes to extract the benefits 
from the agent doing the work; however, the principal is not able to perfectly observe 
the effort of the agent. 𝑣ℎ and 𝑣𝑙represents the value of a good/bad outcome to the 
principal, 𝑤ℎ and 𝑤𝑙 are the wages offered to the agent for a good/bad outcome, and 
𝑒ℎ and 𝑒𝑙 are the cost to the agent of putting forth high/low effort. 𝑝 and 𝑞 represent 
the probability of a good outcome depending on the effort level of the agent. The 
principal is the first party to act, deciding whether or not to offer a contract, and if 
they do offer, how much to offer for a good outcome (G) or a bad outcome (B). The 
agent then has to decide if she wants to accept or decline the contract, and should 
she accept, she then has to decide if she wants to devote high or low levels of effort. 
However there is a stochastic element present in that high levels of effort by the 
agent will not guarantee a good outcome, and low levels of effort will not guarantee 
a bad outcome, so the agent could devote low levels of effort and still achieve a 
good outcome.  
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Figure 2. Principal-Agent Problem 
There is also imperfect monitoring present as the principal cannot measure 
the effort of the agent and only the final outcome, introducing an element of risk to 
the interaction. As a result, the principal does not know if there was a good outcome, 
because the agent put forth high effort or put in low effort and still achieved a 
favorable outcome. The principal then must design the contract to entice the agent 
to put in the required effort in order to reach the desired outcome (called the 
incentive constraint). The principal may not always want to induce high effort from 
the agent, though, as the principal must look at the expected productivity gained 
from the agent putting forth high effort. If there is a large difference between the cost 
of high versus low effort to the agent, the agent may not be willing to put forth the 
extra effort if the expected wage gain is relatively small. The principal must also 
consider how risk averse the agent is when deciding how to offer the contract. As 
the agent becomes more risk averse the principal may want to make 𝑤ℎ closer to 𝑤𝑙 
so there is more of a “guaranteed” payment to the agent.  
There are several different studies that have looked at how this incentive 
constraint impacts the behavior of the principal and the agent, as well as ways to 
help reduce or eliminate these effects. When there is a collaborative effort between 
the principal and the agent, Iyer, Schwarz, and Zenios argued that the principal 
should provide some of her own resources (equipment, capital, etc.) to reduce the 
cost of the project (2005). While this may seem strange, it is advantageous to the 
principal in that it helps her gain hidden information about the supplier’s capability by 
the exchanging of information helping remove some of the uncertainty in observing 
the agent’s effort (Iyer et al., 2005). This resource allocation depends on whether the 
principal’s involvement is a substitute or a complement to the supplier’s capability (a 
substitute in that the principal’s resources reduce the number of steps while the 
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supplier’s resources influence the cost of each step). Iyer et al. found that when the 
principal’s resources act as substitutes, that increasing their commitment lowers the 
supplier’s marginal capability, thus the principal should commit more resources 
(2005). They also stated that the buyer should commit all their resources and offer a 
fixed price to achieve the optimal contract. However, when the resource commitment 
acts as a complement, it is advantageous to scale back their contribution. The 
principal offers contracts that either involve little resource commitment, or a larger 
resource commitment by the principal but as a price discount. The more capable 
agent will then find it beneficial to choose the contract with a higher resource 
commitment from the principal because it will mean a larger cost reduction and a 
larger profit (Iyer et al., 2005). 
Sappington (1991) looked at a similar situation where the agent has more 
knowledge about the environment, and how the principal can use this to help shape 
the interaction. One way of doing this is by asking the agent to give a prediction of 
the environment she expects to be in and then link the contract back to the forecast. 
This can also be extended to a competitive environment by asking each agent to 
predict not only her own environment, but also that of her competitor. The effort of 
the agent also depends on the length of the interaction, since if it is only a one time 
deal then agent does not have as much incentive to provide the desired level of 
work. However, if the agent knows it will be a repeated interaction this can help 
remove some of the risk (Sappington, 1991). 
Of significant interest is the role project scope, the effect that newly designed 
parts have in terms of time and cost, has on the process. Clark (1989) focused on 
this area and how this affected various projects across different relationships. Clark 
found that a large reason for the difference in time and cost of projects could be 
attributed to project scope, specifically, that it could be advantageous to design and 
develop new products rather than adapting existing ones. A small change in the 
scope of a project was shown to reduce the development time of the project by 
several months. Clark also argued that the better the relationship is between the two 
parties, the more profound this effect is. 
Bromiley (1991) looked at the effect that risk had on performance and how 
past performance as well as industry conditions affected future risk-taking by firms. 
The main finding was that performance and past industry performance both had 
strong negative effects on risk-taking (low industry performance increases risk-taking 
by firms), while expectations and aspirations had positive effects, increasing risk-
taking (Bromiley, 1991). While initially, only the previous year was considered when 
looking at risk, the long-term effects from two to four years ago were also analyzed. 
Bromiley found that the influence of risk on performance from four years ago was 
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greater than the influence from the previous year, which illustrates the long-term 
lingering effects of risk on firms. 
An example of this environment would be if the military wishes to work with a 
company in the development of a new technology, such as new computer software. 
The military, in this case the principal, would hire the contractor, the agent, to 
develop this desired software. However, there is always the possibility that 
complications will arise or problems develop that are unforeseen by the contractor 
and, as a result, the contractor may be hesitant to provide their full effort in 
development. The military could help this situation, though, by providing some of its 
own engineers to work on the project in conjunction with the contractor. The military 
could also ask the contractor to provide estimates for the probabilities of different 
problems that may arise and base part of the contract on these predictions to 
prevent them from over- or underestimating to the contractor’s advantage. For 
example, the military could provide a higher contract award amount to a software 
development contractor if the contractor believes that problems are very unlikely to 
occur but decrease payment if problems not predicted do occur during development. 
The contractor now has an incentive to accurately predict what they expect to 
happen. It would also benefit the military for the contractor to believe that the military 
will need to procure related items in the future, which leads to the belief of a possible 
repeated interaction. Knowing that current success could affect future contracts, the 
contractor now has a larger incentive to perform well and devote more effort in 
hopes of gaining a good reputation with the military.  
Based on the research of Iyer et al.; Sappington; Clark; and Bromiley, the 
interaction between the principal and the agent relies on several different conditions. 
First, it is beneficial for the principal to share the risk with the agent in terms of how 
the contract is structured. It is also advantageous to the principal to allocate some of 
their own resources to help the agent in order to reduce cost and gain information. 
The principal can also attempt to reduce the knowledge gap by asking the agent 
what she expects to happen and link the contract to this prediction. Past 
performance, industry conditions, and company goals can also be looked at to help 
determine risk attitudes of different firms. The principal can use all these tools to 
help gain a better understanding of the environment, but the optimal contract will 
depend on the degree of risk sharing and knowledge gap between the parties. 
A final note worth mentioning is that it may be worthwhile for the principal to 
ask the agent to provide estimates for the cost and risk of the project and use these 
in contract development. An example of such estimates is shown in Figure 3, where 
Agent 1 predicts a lower cost but a larger variance, while Agent 2 predicts a higher 
average cost with smaller variance. 
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Figure 3. Variance in Cost Predictions 
While Agent 2 predicts a higher cost, she would only be penalized if she ended up at 
an event that she predicted was not likely, but still ended up there (i.e., Point a). 
Because she is more confident of her price range, she should be penalized if this 
unlikely event occurred, whereas Agent 1 predicts a larger variance resulting in a 
larger spread in cost, so Agent 1 should be penalized only at an equally unlikely 
point. 
Procurement with Multiple Agents 
In Procurement with a Single Agent, we assumed the military was working 
with only one agent. In this next section, we relax this assumption and allow the 
military to work with a variety of contractors (i.e., agents).  
With the introduction of multiple agents (or bidders), the principal’s problem 
now becomes twofold: First, the principal must structure the optimal contract while 
considering the effects of moral hazard, risk sharing, and competition amongst the 
bidders; and second, the principal must then structure the competition environment 
so as to reveal the best bidder (note: the definition of best is purposely vague here, 
and is elaborated on later). 
In constructing the optimal contract, we start with modeling the ex post cost of 
the project or task. We assume n agents (n>1), and that the ex post cost to agent i 
has three components (McAfee & McMillan, 1986): 
𝑐𝑖 =  𝑐𝑖
∗ + 𝑤 − 𝜉                                                            (8) 
where 𝑐𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ agent’s expected cost, w represent the unpredictable costs which 
may be incurred during the course of the project, and 𝜉 is the effort put forth by the 
agent to reducing costs (this cannot be observed by the principal). Furthermore, we 
assume the principal to be risk-neutral and to design a contract to minimize his 
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expected payment to the agent. We also assume that the contract’s payment, P, is 
contingent on both the ex post cost of the project, c, and the winning agent’s bid, b, 
and is also linear (McAfee & McMillan, 1986): 
𝑃 = ⍺𝑐 + 𝛽𝑏 + 𝛾                                                               (9) 
for some constants ⍺, β, and γ . 
This yields three distinct types of contracts. If ⍺ = 1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 = 0, (9) defines a 
cost-plus contract. That is, the principal agrees to cover all of the costs associated 
with the project. If ⍺ = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 = 1, (9) defines a fixed-price contract, in which the 
principal agrees to pay a fixed ex ante price. Now, if 0 < ⍺ < 1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 = 1 − ⍺ , (9) 
defines an incentive contract (i.e., the agent is responsible for a fraction, 1 − ⍺ , of 
any cost overrun; McAfee & McMillan, 1986). Note that in practice, the government 
uses two types of incentive contracts: cost-plus-incentive and fixed-price-incentive, 
but that McAfee and McMillan (1986) did not differentiate between the two in their 
analysis (this prompts further research). 
After solving for the expected-utility-maximizing choice of b and 𝜉, McAfee 
and McMillan (1986) then moved on to find the principal’s expected-payment-
minimizing choice of contract (given the agent’s optimizing behavior). In the first 
portion, they found that the larger the share of costs paid for by the government, the 
less effort any individual firm is willing to exert towards lowering costs (as 
⍺ increases, ξ decreases). Furthermore, bids decline as ⍺ rises, ceterus peribus. 
The explanation is that an increase in the winning bidder’s costs covered by the 
principal is similar to a reduction in the variance of expected costs for all bidders, 
and so competition will drive down the bids. They also found that ⍺ = 1  (cost-plus 
contract) can never be an optimal solution for the principal. When ⍺ = 1, bids bear 
no relationship to expected costs, and so the lowest-cost firm is likely not selected 
by the principal. Moreover, they concluded that incentive-contracts are usually the 
optimal choice. 
The second half of a principal-(multiple) agent problem is shaping the bidding 
environment itself; Asker and Cantillon (2008) offered valuable insight. They focused 
their analysis on auctions which offer flexibility in terms of contract specification. 
They attributed three types to this category: (1) “beauty contest,” wherein the 
principal gives the agents a range of attributes that she cares about, but request only 
a single offer; (2) “menu auction,” in which the agents submit menus of price and 
nonmonetary attributes, and the principal picks the one which best suits her needs; 
and (3) scoring auction—the principal announces the way she ranks different 
attributes ex ante, the agents then submit offers on all dimensions of the product, 
and then the bid which scored the highest according to the principal’s ranking 
schedule is chosen (Asker & Cantillon, 2008). 
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Asker and Cantillon found that, from the buyer’s perspective, scoring auctions 
strictly dominate price-only auctions, and they weakly dominate menu auctions and 
beauty contests when an open ascending format is used. With a sealed-bid “second 
price” format, scoring auctions weakly dominate a menu auction and strictly 
dominate a beauty contest. Moreover, first price menu auctions were found to 
always be inefficient. They concluded that scoring auctions generally provide higher 
utility to the principal. 
McAfee and McMillan provided very useful results, but their research is 
limited strictly to linear contracts. In the case where the agent can choose to exert 
more than two levels of effort, non-linear contracts may be more efficient. Instead of 
just high or low effort the agent may choose from a schedule of effort levels 𝑒𝑛, 𝑛 =
{1, 2, … , 𝑛}, or the agent may choose from a continuous distribution of effort rather 
than just discrete choices. An example contract follows:  
𝑝 =  {
10, where 𝑞(𝑒) < 10
25, where 10 ≤ 𝑞(𝑒) ≤ 20
30, where 20 ≤ 𝑞(𝑒)
}                                                  (10) 
where 𝑝 is the payment to the agent and 𝑞(𝑒) is the output produced by the agent, 
dependent on 𝑒 effort. The payment schedule can also be a continuous function of 
(𝑒) (𝑒. 𝑔. 𝑝 = √𝑞(𝑒)). The payment schedule should be optimized to minimize cost of 
incentivizing effort to the principal while maximizing the agent’s effort. 
Conclusion 
We have described multiple markets in which the government engages in 
acquisitions activities and possible auction-based or principle agent approaches to 
each. In each market, the solution identified is mathematically superior to the 
existing acquisition mechanism, suggesting that modifying acquisitions to match the 
recommendations of this paper will result in greater efficiency and a cost savings to 
the government.   
Several environments favoring auction-based acquisition were examined. The 
first market analyzed, those of simple goods purchased individually used a classic 
auction type known as a Vickery (or second-price) auction, which reveals bidders’ 
true values and results in an efficient allocation of bids. The second market, simple 
goods purchased from a multitude of firms, opts for a dynamic Vickery auction as it 
achieves a similarly efficient result as other auction types while being easy to 
understand and implement. The third market analyzed, that of differentiated goods, 
opts for a multi attribute scoring auction with budget considered an independent 
variable in single negotiations and as a variable constraint in situations where 
renegotiation is likely.  This allows for greater flexibility and less risk in future years, 
despite several possible limitations.  
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 25 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Next we examined principle-agent relationships, where items are procured 
amongst unknown cost and risk or known cost and existent but understood 
stochastic risk, which generally is the realm of developmental goods. Among these, 
the fourth market analyzed is of interactions of the principle with agents in single 
agent procurements, where the government is executing a contract with only one 
offeror. In this environment the optimal contract will depend on the degree of risk 
sharing and knowledge gap between the parties. The fifth market consists of multiple 
agent procurements, where the government is executing a contract with multiple 
independent offerors. In this case, scoring auctions generally provide higher utility to 
the principle. These suggestions look to narrow the knowledge and risk gap between 
the government and the contractor to reduce cost and risk in future years and 
throughout the life of the contract. 
Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the contracting environments 
need to be approached differently in order to maintain competition and encourage 
truthful reports from participants. The current bidding structure often does not 
provide adequate incentives for bidders to accurately report their costs; however, 
simple modifications could be made for this to happen. This would help increase 
competition and allow the government to get better contracts while still acquiring all 
necessary items and services.  
Authors’ Note 
At multiple points in this paper the use of singular pronouns (e.g. him, her, 
and she) was best for clarity. Desiring to show no bias, we favored male pronouns in 
the auctions portion of the paper and female pronouns in the principle-agent portion 
of the paper for simplicity in editing. 
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Appendix 
Appendix items 1 and 2 are taken directly from “The Lovely but Lonely 
Vickrey Auction” by Ausubel and Milgrom (2006). They include form and illustrative 
examples of the VCG mechanism. 
(1) Formal VCG mechanism: 
Formally, the VCG mechanism is described as follows. Let x be a 
vector of goods that a seller has on offer and let vn (xn ) denote bidder 
n’s value for any nonnegative vector xn . Each bidder n = 1,..., N 
reports a value function vˆn to the auctioneer. The auctioneer then 
computes a value-maximizing allocation: x* ∈ arg maxx1 ,...,x N  ∑n 
vˆn (xn ) subject to ∑n xn ≤ x . The price paid by a bidder n is then pn = 
α n −∑m ≠ n vˆm (xm* ) , where αn = max{∑ m ≠ n vˆm (xm ) | ∑m ≠n 
xm ≤ x}. Notice that αn depends only on the value reports of the other 
bidders and not on what bidder n reports (Ausubel & Milgrom, 2006). 
(2) Illustrative VCG mechanism: 
To illustrate the VCG mechanism, suppose that there are two items for 
sale (A and B) and two bidders. Each bidder n = 1,2 submits bids: vˆn 
(A) for item A; vˆn(B) for item B; and vˆn (AB) for the two items 
together. Assume without loss of generality that vˆ1 (AB) ≥ vˆ2(AB) and 
vˆ1 (A) + vˆ 2 (B) ≥ vˆ1 (B) + vˆ2(A) . If vˆ1 (AB) > vˆ1 (A) +vˆ2(B) , then 
the outcome is that bidder 1 wins both items. Applying the formula, his 
payment is vˆ2(AB). However, if vˆ1 (AB) < vˆ1 (A) +vˆ2(B) , then the 
outcome is that bidder 1 wins item A (with an associated payment 
of  vˆ 2 (AB) − vˆ2(B) ) and bidder 2 wins items B (with an associated 
payment of vˆ1 (AB) − vˆ1(A) ). In each case, the winner pays the 
opportunity cost of the items won, and his payment depends only on 
his opponent’s reports (Ausubel & Milgrom, 2006). 
The final appendix item is taken from Ausubel’s “An Efficient Ascending-Bid 
Auction for Multiple Items” (2004). 
(3) An illustrative example of the Dynamic Vickrey auction: 
I will illustrate my proposal for an ascending-bid, multi-unit auction with 
an example loosely patterned after the first U.S. spectrum auction, the 
Nationwide Narrowband Auction. There are five identical licenses for 
auction. Bidders have taste for more than one license, but each is 
limited to winning at most three licenses. There are five bidders with 
values in the relevant range, and their marginal values are given as in 
Table 1 [on the following page] (where numbers are expressed in 
millions of dollars): 
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For example, if Bidder A were to purchase two licenses at prices of 75 
each, her total utility from the transaction would be computed by: uA 
(1) + uA (2) − 75 − 75 = 123 + 113 − 150 = 86. In this example, bidders 
are presumed to possess complete information about their rivals’ 
valuations. 
The proposed auction is operated as an ascending-clock auction. The 
auctioneer announces a price, p, and each bidder i responds with a 
quantity, qi ( p) . The auctioneer then calculates the aggregate demand 
and increases the price until the market clears. Payments are 
calculated according to a “clinching” rule. Suppose that the auction 
begins with the auctioneer announcing a price of $10 million (+ ε). 
Bidders A−E, if bidding sincerely according to the valuations of Table 
1, would respond with demands of 3, 1, 3, 2 and 2, respectively. The 
aggregate demand of 11 exceeds the available supply of 5, so the 
auction must proceed further. Assume that the auctioneer increases 
the price continuously. Bidder E reduces his quantity demanded from 2 
to 1 at $25 million, Bidder E drops out of the auction completely at $45 
million and Bidder C reduces his quantity demanded from 3 to 2 at $49 
million, yielding: 
 
The aggregate demand, now 8, continues to exceed the available 
supply of 5, so the price must rise further. When the price reaches $65 
million, Bidder D reduces her demand from 2 to 1, but the aggregate 
demand of 7 continues to exceed the available supply of 5: 
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However, let us examine this situation carefully from Bidder A’s 
perspective. The demands of all bidders other than Bidder A (i.e., 1 + 2 
+ 1 + 0) total only 4, while 5 licenses are available for sale. If Bidders 
B–E bid monotonically, Bidder A is now mathematically guaranteed to 
win at least one license. In the language of this paper (and in the 
standard language of American sports writing), Bidder A has clinched 
winning one unit. The rules of the auction take this calculation quite 
literally, by awarding each bidder any units that she clinches, at the 
clinching price. Bidder A thus wins a license at $65 million. 
Since there is still excess demand, price continues upward. With 
continued sincere bidding relative to the valuations in Table 1, the next 
change in demands occurs at a price of $75 million. Bidder B drops out 
of the auction, but the aggregate demand of 6 continues to exceed the 
available supply of 5: 
 
However, again examine the situation from Bidder A’s perspective. Her 
opponents collectively demand only 0 + 2 + 1 + 0 = 3 units, whereas 5 
units are available. It may now be said that she has clinched winning 2 
units: whatever happens now (provided that her rivals bid 
monotonically), she is certain to win at least 2 units. Hence, the auction 
awards a second unit to Bidder A at the new clinching price of $75 
million. By the same token, let us examine this situation from Bidder 
C’s perspective. Bidder C’s opponents collectively demand only 3 + 0 + 
1 + 0 = 4 units, whereas 5 units are available. He has now clinched 
winning 1 unit: whatever happens now (provided that his rivals bid 
monotonically), he is certain to win at least 1 unit. Hence, the auction 
awards one unit to Bidder C at a price of $75 million. 
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There continues to be excess demand until the price reaches $85 
million. Bidder D then drops out of the auction, yielding: 
 
At $85 million, the market clears. Bidder A, who had already clinched a 
first unit at $65 million and a second at $75 million, wins a third unit at 
$85 million. Bidder C, who had already clinched a first unit at $75 
million, wins a second unit at $85 million. In summary, we have the 
following auction outcome: 
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